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INTRODUCTION

In 2009, the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Litigation
conducted a survey of approximately 3,300 attorneys and concluded that
"[a]lthough the matter has not reached the level of a crisis, there is dissatisfaction
in the bar with litigating civil cases in federal court."I This conclusion mirrored
the results of a similar survey conducted that same year by the American College
of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) Task Force on Discovery and the Institute for the
Advancement of the American Legal System (IAALS), which found that.
"[a]lthough the civil justice system is not broken, it is in serious need of repair.

United States District Judge for the District of Maryland; Member, Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules; Chair, Discovery Subcommittee.
Litigation Associate, Fried, Frank, H-arris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP (New York); J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center.
The views expressed herein are those of the authors only and do not represent the views of the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
or Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson LLP.
1. Mlemnber Survey on Civil Practice: Detailed Report, 2009 A.B.A. SEC. LITIG. REP. 5. 6
[hereinafter Miember Survey], available at http://wNiv.uscourts.gov/uscourtsRulesAndPolicies/rules/
Duke%20Materials/Library/ABA%20OSection%/20of% 20Litigation,%2OSurvey%"20o0n%2OCivil%20
Practice.pdf.
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In many jurisdictions, today's system takes too long and costs too much." 2 Few
practicing attorneys would be surprised that discovery was singled out as "the
primary cause for cost and delay," and often "can become an end in itself."
The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules has responded to these criticisms
over the last several years and has sought out ways to fulfill the Rules' promise
of "secur[ing] the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding."
Meaningful improvements have resulted: the electronic
discovery provisions included in the 2006 amendments to the Civil Rules sought
to adapt discovery to the changing technological demands of the twenty-first
century 6 Other changes, such as the adoption of Rule 502 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, sought to ease the burdens caused by massive amounts of
electronically stored information (ESI) by reducing the penalties for inadvertent
production of privileged material in large document reviews.
However, the core problems remain. In 2010, the Advisory Committee
convened the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation, commonly known as the
Duke Conference, which brought legal scholars and members of the bench and

2.
Am. COLL. OFTRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE Am. LEGAL
Sys.. FINAL REPORT ON TIE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN

LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009) [hereinafter ACTL/TAALS REPORT], available at http://www.actlcom/
AM /Template.cfm?Section=Home&templIate=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=4008.
3. Mlenber Survey, supra note 1. at 6: see also ACTL/IAALS REPORT. supra note 2. at 1
(identifying "increasing concerns that problems in the civil justice system, especially those relating
to discovery have resulted in unacceptable delays and prohibitive expense").
4.
ACTL/1AALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 2. Both the ABA and the ACTL/TAALS Reports
offered findings and recommendations regarding the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, generally,
and did not focus exclusively on discovery provisions. See ACTL/IAALS REPORT, supra note 2. at
4 5 (criticizing the "one size fits all' approach" of the Federal Rules); id. at 5 7 (discussing notice
pleading); id. at 18-24 (citations omitted) (discussing dispositive motions and the need for active
judicial management, generally); see also Menber Survey, supra note 1. at 12-13 (discussing
disagreement regarding notice pleading and the utility of dispositive motions and dissatisfaction
with the speed with which courts decide dispositive motions).
5.
FED. R. CiV. P. 1.
6.
See HON. LEE H. ROSENTHAL. ADVISORY COMM. ON THE FED. RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE 18 (2005).
The 2006

amendment arose out of an extended effort to "examin[e] whether the discovery rules could better
accommodate discovery directed at information generated by. stored in. retrieved from, and
exchanged through, computers." Id Following an extensive study "the Committee reached
consensus on two points. First, electronically stored information has important differences from
information recorded on paper.... Second, these differences are causing problems in discovery that
rule amendments can helpfully address." Id.
7. Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence represented ain attempt to relieve some of the
pressure created by e-discovery and placed on the system by the need to thoroughly review massive
amounts of electronically stored information for privilege. See FED. R. EvID. 502; Hopson v.
Mavor & City Council of Balt., 232 F.R.D. 228. 231-32 (D. Md. 2005) (discussing the lack of legal
protection for privileged material inadvertently produced and the resulting need for costly and timeconsuming privilege review ofmassive amounts of ESI).
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bar together "to step back, to take a hard look at how well the Civil Rules are
working, and to analyze feasible and effective ways to reduce costs and delays."
The Duke Conference took a hard look at the entirety of the civil justice
system. Reams of empirical data wvere presented to identify and diagnose the
perceived shortcomings of civil practice. 9 The Conference explored deep
theoretical questions regarding the proper aim of the civil justice system,
including "Is the Litigation Process Structured for Settlement Rather than Trial
and Should It Be?" 0 and at least one proposal to redefine the very purpose of the
Civil Rules.' Likewise, focused discussions were held regarding specific and
perceived problems with the Civil Rules and their possible solutions.
All of this discussion yielded no shortage of suggestions for how the Rules
could be improved-including several proposals regarding the discovery
process. The ACTL/IAALS Report essentially proposed turning the current

8.
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COr9i. ON CIVIL RULES & COrtE. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THL CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 2 (2010) [hereinafter DUKE CONFERENCE REPORT], available

at http://www.uscourts.go/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules'201 0%20report.pdf.
9. See, e.g., REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI. NAT'L EMP'T LAWYERS
Ass'N. SUMMIARY OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS. FALL
2009, at 3, 11 (2010), available at http:/www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke
0
%o20Materials/Library/NELA,% 20Summary%
o20of% 20Resultso20o0f%20FJC o20Survey%020of'o20
NELA%20Members.pdf (surveying approximately 300 members of the National Employment
Lawyers Association and finding that "[n]early 65% of NELA respondents find that existing
discovery mechanisms do not work well, and approximately two-thirds believe that discovery is
abused in almost every case"); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYs.. CIVIL
LITIGATION SURVEY OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL BELONGING TO THL
ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 1 (2010), available at http://wwN.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke 0 o2OMaterials/LibraryTIAALS, 0 o20General 0"OCounsel0 o2?0Surve-y.pdf
(surveying corporate counsel on various aspects of the civil justice system and finding that "[a]
majority of respondents agreed that the American civil justice systein is 'too complex"' and that
"90% agreed that it takes 'too long' and 97% agreed that it is 'too expensive"'); LAWYERS FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL.. LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010). available at

lttp://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke o20Materials/Library/Litigationo20C
0
osto20Siirey%200f%2O0Major oCompanies.pdf
(finding that "the transaction costs of litigation
against large companies, especially discovery are so high that the mandate of Rule I ... is simply
not being met"); Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, 'A Grin Without a Cat': Civil Trials in the
Federal Courts 1 (May 1, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at lttp://www.uscours.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke 0 o20Materials/Library/Marc 0 OGalanter%0oOando2OAngelao2
OFrozena, 0 20A 02OGrin%0"OWithouto20a%0 OCat.pdf (finding that "the civil trial is approaching
extinction" ).
10. See 2010 Civil Litigation Conference, Conference Agenda, at 3 (emphasis added),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke 0%o20Materials/Library/Conference%o2O
Agenda%20-%/o20Final.pdf.
11. See id. at 2-3; see also Robert G. Bone, Impraving Rule 1 A Master Rule for the Federal
Rules. 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 287. 288 (2010) (arguing that Rule I "embodies ... assumptions that
make little sense for modem litigation and stand in the way of effective procedural design").
12. See Conference Agenda, supra note 10. The Duke Conference included panels titled:
"Issues with the Current State of Discovery: Is There Really Excessive Discovery, and if so, What
Are the Possible Solutions?" and "E-Discovery: Discussion of the Cost Benefit Analysis of EDiscovery and the Degree to Which the New Rules Are Working or Not." Id.
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discovery system on its head: eliminating the broad scope of discovery under
Rule 26 and replacing it with more expansive initial disclosures tailored closely
to the parties' claims and defenses, and only permitting limited additional
discovery as necessary.
Other proposals suggested cost shifting or even
adopting the "English Rule," tinder which the requesting party pays for
discovery; 14 moving away from notice pleading in favor of fact pleading as a
prelude to more limited discovery;
or providing clearer guidance on
preservation obligations to decrease the costs and risks of e-discovery.16 None
of these changes have been implemented, but in the wake of the Duke
Conference, the perception that "[t]he need for revision of the discovery
provisions of the rules is urgent and immediate" has continued unabated.17

13. ACTL/IAALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-14. The use of "staged discovery" and
significantly narrowing the scope of permitted discovery have been frequently advocated as means
to reduce the overwhelming cost of discovery. See, e.g., Patrick J. Stueve & E.E. Keenan, Pre-trial
Cost Reform Implerative to Preserving Endangered Jury Trial (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourt-/RulesAindPolicie-/rules/iuke 0 OMaterials/Library!
Patrick o20Stueve o2Oand%020E.E.o20Keenan,%o20Pre-Trial%o20Cost% 2ORefonm.pdf (advocating the
use of "staged discovery," focusing first on dispositive issues).
14. See JOHN H. BEISNER, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, THE CENTRE CANNOT
HOLD: THE NEED FOR EFFECTIVE REFORM OF THE U.S. CIVIL DISCOVERY PROCESS 26-29 (2010)

(citations omitted), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreforn.coin/sites/default/files/ilr
discovery_2010_0.pdf (suggesting reforms on preservation obligations as a means to reduce the cost
of e-discovery).
15. See Amy Schulman & Sheila Birnbaum, From Both Sides Now: Additional Perspectives
on "Uncovering Discovery" 2 (2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke 20Materials/Library/Amy%0oOSchulmnan% 0oOand%0oOSheila
0
%20Birnbaum,%20From% 0OBoth%0OSides%/
20Now.pdf (arguing that "[d]iscovery and trials
would be more efficient and fair" under fact pleading): see also ACTL/LAALS REPORT, supra note
2, at 5-6 (suggesting that fact pleading should replace notice pleading and noting that "[d]iscovery
cannot be framed to address the facts in controversy if the system of pleading fails to identify
them."). But see, e.g., Menber Survey, supra note 1, at 12 ("Plaintiffs' lawyers generally support
notice pleading and generally do not believe there is an advantage to fact pleading for the purpose of
narrowing issues.").
16. One panel focused primarily on this issue and included several proposals for reform. See,
e.g., Thomas Y. Allman. Preservation and Spoliation Revisited: Is It Time for Additional
Rulemaking? 22 (April 9, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke 0OMaterials/Library/Thomas 0 0Allman,0Preservation 0o2O
and% 0 Spoliation%20Revisited.pdf (advocating for a uniform federal preservation rule); John M.
Barkett. Zubulake Revisited: Pension Committee and the Duty To Preserve 28-29 (2010)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAindPolicies/'rules!
Duke 0OMaterials/Library/John 0OBarkett,%/2OZubulake 0 Revisited.pdf
(outlining
proper
preservation conduct after Pension Committee) Gregory P. Joseph, Electronic Discovery and Other
Problems 1 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http:/wvw.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke0 o2OMaterials/Libraiy/Gregory 0 OP. 0OJoseph,%/20Electronic%/o20Disc
overo20and00Other 0 Problems.pdf ("Precisely when, in the absence of litigation, is the duty
to preserve evidence triggered?").
17. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., THE TIME IS Now: TiHE URGENT NEED FOR
DISCOVERY RULE REFORMS 3-4, 6 (2011), available at http://ww.nldhlaw.com/Nwp-content/
uploads/2012/07/LCJ-Comment-The- Time-is-Now -The-Urgent-Need-for-E-Discov ery-Rule-Reforms-
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The stakes remain high: "the savings of adopting meaningful preservation
rules could be measured in the billions of dollars for businesses and individual
litigants."18 Courts and parties have tried some creative solutions. With the
identification of the review of EST as the greatest driver of discovery costsoften accounting for at least 70% of the total costs of productionl9 some courts
are experimenting with new innovations, such as predictive coding,20 to reduce
the number of nonresponsive documents that must be reviewed, thereby
controlling costs. 21 But, because nobody has found a. reliable way to reduce th~e
costs of document21production and because predictive coding remains a largely
untested solution, there remains a pressing need to find other ways to control
discovery costs.24
Accordingly, the calls for reform persist. The Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee's Constitution Subcommittee recently noted that the costs
of civil discovery "make access to the justice system more expensive for
individuals and businesses alike," and even "hamper the American economy."25
Advocates of change say that "the savings from a single rule change" could be in
the billions.26

103 111 pdf (arguing that given the burdens of preservation and production of massive amounts of
ESI, the rules are no longer effective for controlling the discovery process).
18. Id. at 10.
19. See NICHOLAS M. PACE & LAURA ZAKARAS, RAND CORP., WHERE THE MONEY GOES:
UNDERSTANDING LITIGANT EXPENDITURES FOR PRODUCING ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY, at xvi

(2012).
20. Predictive coding is a computerized method of searching large data sets of ESI which
uses an algorithm that allows lawyers to rank a small sampling of documents as relevant or not, and
the computer program then refines the search methodology in light of the rankings. After a few
reviews of randomly selected sample documents, the computer is able to search the much larger
data set and select those documents matching the search criteria with great accuracy and at much
less expense than would be incurred by having attorneys or paraprofessionals review the documents
manually. See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, No. 11 Civ. 1279(ALC)(AJP), 2012 WL 607412, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2012) (quoting Andrew Peck, Search, Forward,L. TECH. NEWS, Oct. 2011 , at
25, 29).
21. See id. at *12 (approving, for the first time, the use of predictive coding in document
production under the Federal Rules).
22. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 19, at xvii.
23. See id. at xvii xviii. But see Moore, 2012 WL 607412, at *12 (approving use of
predictive coding).
24. See, e.g., Mary Mack, Maty Mack: Litigation Prenups, E-Discovely ADR and the
Campaign for Proportionality,METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., May 2010, at 10, available at
http://ww.netrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2010/May/10.pdf (discussing "the pressing need to control
outsized e-discovery cases").
25. Letter from Trent Franks, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm., Constitution Subcomm., to
Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chairman, U.S. Judicial Conference Comm. on Rules of Practice &
Procedure & ion. David G. Campbell, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory Comm. (Mar. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter Franks Letter], available at http://iaals.du.edu/images/wygwain/documents/
publications/FRCP Franks_ LTR to Kra-vitz and Campbell_032112.pdf.
26. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 17, at II.
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Given these high stakes, it is remarkable that comprehensive change has not
already occurred. But, although there is broad agreement that the Civil Rules
need to be changed, there is little agreement as to how.27 Nor is this outcry for
change a new development. Indeed, as Roscoe Pound observed over a century
ago, "Dissatisfaction with the administration of justice is as old as law."2 8 The
Civil Rules "Committee considered, and rejected, a proposal to narrow the scope
of discovery from 'relevant to the subject matter' to 'relevant to the issues raised
by the claims or defenses,' and to limit the number of interrogatories" while
attempting to address problems with discovery in 1980.29 In 2000, the Rules
were amended to make that change, allowing discovery of "any matter relevant
to the subject matter" only on a showing of good cause.30 Prior to the 2000
amendment, the Committee made changes to address "continued unhappiness
But dissatisfaction
about discovery costs and related litigation delays." 1
32
remains, and although proposals for reform currently abound. there is no

27. It is worth noting that not everyone wvho has discussed the matter has taken the position
that radical change is needed. See. e.g., Hon. Paul W. Grimm, The State of Discoveiy Practice in
Civil Cases: fust the Rules Be Changed to Reduce Costs and Burden, or Can Significant
Imfprovemnents Be Achieved 4ithin the Existing Rules?, 12 SEDONA CONF J. 47, 49 (2011) ("While
it is possible to envision some changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure. it is worth asking whether
that is the best route to improvement, or whether the real problem is the failure to adhere to the
Rules in their current form. In fact, the existing Rules provide all of the necessary tools to achieve
the changes in practice that have eluded us for decades."); Letter from Tony West, Assistant
Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to Hon. David G. Campbell, Chairman, Civil Rules Advisory
Comm. (Mar. 6, 2012), available at http:/www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/
0
Agenda%2
OBooks/Civii/CV2012-03_ Addendum.pdf (taking the position that rule reforms to more
clearly define the duty to preserve evidence are premature and may be unnecessary). Indeed, when
backed up by active judicial oversight, faithful application of the rules as already written can
penalize discovery abuses. See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354,
356-57, 359 (D. Md. 2008) (emphasizing Rules 26(g) and 33(b)(4)). In Mancia, Judge Grimm, one
of this Article's authors, noted that the common practice of reflexively objecting to discovery
requests with a litany of boilerplate objections was a violation of Rule 33(b)(4) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure which requires the basis of an objection to be stated with specificity-and was
also indicative of a violation of Rule 26(g)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which
requires any discovery response to reflect counsel's "knowledge, information, and belief forned
after a reasonableinquiry." Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 356-57 (emphasis added) (quoting FED. R. Civ.
P. 26(g)(1)). Judge Grimm also observed that "[t]he failure to engage in discovery as required by
Rule 26(g) is one reason wlhy the cost of discovery is so widely criticized as being excessive." Id. at
359.
28. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of PopularDissatisfaction iith the AdinmistrationofJustice,
14 AM. LAW. 445, 445 (1906).
29. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 19.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The United States District Court for the District of Maryland
has described the difference between "relevant to the claims and defenses" and relevant "to the
subject matter" as being "the juridical equivalent to debating the number of angels that can dance on
the head of a pin." Thompson v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 199 F.R.D. 168, 172 (D. Md.
2001).
31. ROSENTHAL, supra note 6, at 20.
32. See, e.g., ACTL/LAALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 7-14 (listing possible solutions to
discovery issues); BEISNER, supra note 14, at 26-30 (outlining several proposals for reform).
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indication that any of the new proposals rest on any firmer ground than the
marginal fixes of the past several decades.
This Article seeks to find that firmer ground, by focusing not only on
identifying the problems plaguing civil discovery, but also on understanding
their causes. It may be that the Civil Rules are not tip to the task of guiding and
channeling civil discovery. But it is painfully obvious that the Rules, as written,
have at least the potential to provide better limits on discovery; thus, looking at
the Rules alone will yield only limited insight.33 By shedding light on why civil
discovery has become so problematic, this Article will attempt to explore how
the causes of discovery problems can be addressed. Rather than focusing on the
Rules alone, this Article will look at the behavior and motivations of litigants
and courts in the twenty-first century, from the perspective of an experienced
trial court judge and a practicing attorney. This practical, behavioral approach
has an additional advantage: although this Article will focus on federal civil
practice, its insights will most likely be applicable in state cases as well.
11.

INSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS IN CIVIL PRACTICE

The dissatisfaction with the civil justice system did not simply appear ex
nihilo. Rather, it has a panoply of causes-including. perhaps, the reality that it
is impossible to create a civil justice system devoid of flaws or loopholes.
However, a few systemic changes have occurred in civil practice since the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were enacted in 1938, which means that even if
the Rules were perfectly oriented for their purpose when enacted, the realities of
litigation have changed so as to render them less fitting now. Perhaps the most
significant changes are: (1) a significant decline in the number of cases that go to
trial and, specifically, in the number of jury trials; (2) a shift in the legal system
in favor of claims lending themselves to expansive discovery; and (3) an
evolution in how discovery is understood and used.
A.

The VanishingJuy Trial

One major issue in the modern civil justice system is that it is no longer
oriented toward trying cases; rather, the number of trials has declined sharply in
recent years, and more and more cases are being settled or resolved in pretrial
practice. As Judge Mark Kravitz explained:

33. If nothing else, a court could apply the proportionality requirement of Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to prevent some of the most severe abuses. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)
("[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it determines that: ... the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, the parties resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues." (emphasis added)).
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The number of trials held each year in courts across the country,
both state and federal, is declining at what to some is an alarming rate,
all at the same time that nominal case filings are increasing. This
phenomenon, which the data show is quite real, has potentially great
implications for our justice system-for the methods we have devised to
resolve disputes; for the institutions we have created to entertain
disputes; for the training of lawyers to represent clients in those
disputes; and even for the body of law (for example, the rules of
evidence) that we have developed to assist parties and juries to resolve
disputes. 34

Empirical evidence
found that both the
general-in United
last half-century.

confirms this view. Marc Galanter and Angela Frozena
percentage and absolute number of jury trials-and trials in
States District Courts have declined dramatically over the
For example, between 1962 and 2002, there was a striking
decrease in the number of tort cases going to trial: "[wihere once 1 in 6 . . . tort
cases went to trial, this has dropped steadily so that now only 1 in 46 ... do."36
Surveys of practitioners have shown that the Bar has noticed this decline as
well. Respondents to the ABA Survey-a survey of the ABA Litigation Section,
no less-re orted that they averaged less than one trial a year over the previous
five years.
This shift has a real effect on how pretrial practice and discovery
are viewed. Unsurprisingly, in a world without trials, about half of the
respondents thought that discovery was more useful in developing information
for summary judgment or assessing the value of a case for settlement than for
attempting to grasp the other party's claims and defenses for a trial that is
unlikely ever to happen. 3 8 Similarly, the National Employment Lawyers
Association (NELA) found that "trial b' paper is to a large extent supplanting
trial by jury in our civil justice system."
Furthermore, the decline of trials has, in and of itself, been identified as "a
major crisis for the legal profession today."40 United States District Judge

34. Mark R. Kravitz, The Vanishing Trial: A Problem in Need of Solution?, 79 CONN. B. J. 1,
1 2(2005).
35. Galanter & Frozena, supra note 9. at 3-5. Galanter & Frozena found that there were
around 6,000 cases per year in the early 1960s, rising to a peak of over 12,000 trials-about half of
which were jury trials-in 1985. See id at 5. Since, the number of trials has dropped precipitously
and there have been fewer than 4,000 trials per year every year since 2004. See id The percentage
of cases going to trial fell consistently during this time, from nearly 12% of cases in 1962 to well
under 2% in 2010. Id at 4.
36. Marc Galanter, lie Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Mlatters in
Federaland State Courts, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 466 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Member Survey, supra note 1, at 19 (detailing results from the survey responses
on trial experience).
38. Id. at 71-72.
39. HAMBURG & KOSKI, supra note 9, at 7.
40. Robert P. Burns, What Will We Lose If the Trial Vanishes?, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575,
575 (2011).
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William Young went even further, asserting that the "withering away" of the
American j ury trial represents "the most profound change in our j urisprudence in
the history of the Republic." 1
At the very least, it is probably worth taking stock of whether the decrease in
the number of trials may be a problem in and of itself. The ACTL and IAALS
suggest that the lack of cases tried is either a result of the failure of the promise
of Rule 1 or perhaps a cause of the Civil Rules' inability to realize the promise of
Rule 1.42 " Trials do not represent a failure of the system. They are the
cornerstone of the civil justice systen. Unfortunately, because of expense and
delay, both civil bench trials and civil jury trials are disappearing."43 Trials may
be more likely to promote true justice, whereas settlements may often be less a
truly fair outcome and more "a capitulation to the conditions of mass society and
should be neither encouraged nor praised." 44 Judge Kravitz, for example, was
one of many voices urging that "adjudications of some kind are needed to allow
the law to develop."45
But if trials are declining-and the evidence shows that they are -it is not
happening by accident.
Changes in the FederalRules of Civil Procedure and in the judicial
culture in the 1980s and 1990s have led to an increased emphasis on
case management and settlement. This change in emphasis has also
coincided with some of the most dramatic declines in civil trials, leading
some to suppose that federal judges have seen their principal mandate as
disposing of cases as soon as possible, rather than as trying cases.47
"Over 70% [of attorneys responding to the ABA Survey] agree that courtordered dispute resolution increases the number of cases that settle without trial,

41. Hon. William G. Young, An Open Letter to U.S. District Judges, 50 FED. LAW., July
2003, at 30.
42. See ACTL/IAALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 3.
43. Id.
44. Owen M. Fiss. Comment. Against Settlement. 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984). Fiss
argues that settlement "is a truce more than a true reconciliation, but it seems preferable to judgment
because it rests on the consent of both parties and avoids the cost of a lengthy trial." Id. However,
he suggests that "[c]onsent is often coerced; the bargain may be struck by someone without
authority; the absence of a trial and judgment renders subsequent judicial involvement troublesome:
and although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done." Id.
45. Kravitz, supra note 34, at 26; see also Patrick E. Higginbotham, Judge Robert A.
Ainsworth, Jr. lemorialLecture. Loyola UniversitySchool ofLaw: So Why Do We Call Them Trial
Courts?. 55 SMU L. REv. 1405, 1423 (2002) ("Ultimately, law unenforced by courts is no law.").
46. See Galanter & Frozena, supra note 9, at 3 5; Galanter, supra note 36, at 460 70
(citations omitted).
47. Kravitz. supra note 34, at 18; see also Judith Resnik, Migrating. Morphing, and
Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Puzzles of Declining Trial Rates in Courts, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783, 789 (2004) ("[T]he federal judiciary has in recent decades been in
the forefront of the anti-adjudication movement.").
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and over 60% believe that it results in earlier settlements, which is seen as a
positive development across the board."48 Judith Resnick writes about a meeting
in 1994, at which a federal district judge attributed the fact that as many as eight
percent of cases were still going to trial "as evidence of 'lawyers' failure."' 49
However, it is more accurate to see the ascendancy of settlements and
decrease in trials as the success of an environment in which lawyers and judges
are predisposed to push for settlementi. Moreover, if judges are frequently
discouraging cases from going to trial,5 it is hard to imagine that rational
litigants would be champing at the bit to try cases in defiance of the clear
preferences of the presiding judge.
Normative issues aside, the reality is that pretrial practice has, in many
cases. become the only adversarial forum in which cases can be developed and
resole.5 Ralph Nagareda suggests that we are living "in an era in which the
pretrial process has become the trial in practical effect, [and] the pretrial phase
increasingly has taken on trial-like dimensions." 5'
This reality creates a
disconnect with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which have as their clear
aim a process that begins with a complaint and proceeds with discovery and
claim development as way-stations on the road to trial. "[T]he major pretrial
motions today share a common structural feature. All operate-whether in form
or in function-as relatively blunt instruments that signal either 'stop' or 'go' on
the road toward trial."
Therefore, it should be of no surprise that the Civil Rules begin to break
down when litigants are no longer proceeding with an eye towards an
adjudication of their dispute. Indeed, those eager for a hearing on the merits of
their case typically opt out of the Civil Rules altogether and pursue extrajudicial
fora such as arbitration.5 As resolution of disputes out of court becomes an

48. llenber Survey. supra note 1, at 10.
49. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924, 925 (2000).
50. See Michael M. Baylson. Are Civil Jury Trials Going the Way of the Dodo? Has
Excessive Discovery Led to Settlement as an Economic and Cultural Imperative: A Response to
Judge Higginbotham and Judge Hornby 2 (April 14, 2010) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://wv.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke o20Materials/Libraiy/Judge%/o2OBayison.
%o2OAre%20Civil o2OJuryo20Trials o20Going o2Othe%2OWayo20ofo2Othe%2ODodo.pdf.
51. There is evidence to suggest that they are-or at least that litigants believe they are. See,
e.g., HAMBURG & KOSKI, supra note 9, at 40 (finding that over 70% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that "]]udges do not like taking cases to trial").
52. See generally Member Survey, supra note I, at 71 72 (showing that approximately 50%
of lawvers use discovery to develop evidence for summary judgment and to settle a case rather than
prepare for trial).
53. Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 667 (2011).
54. Id. at 652 53.
55. See id. at 692 ("[T]he general tenor of the literature at the intersection of litigation and
arbitration has been one of lament, bordering on alarm. The usual concern is that significant
segments of what was formally civil litigation are now shunted off ... to an opaque regime of
arbitration that lacks the process protections and accountability of the civil lawsuit.").
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ever-more-frequent occurrence, the Civil Rules simply do not work as well.
Rule 26 qualifies that the scope of discovery is purposely broader than that
subset of evidence that can be admitted at trial , but if parties are using
discovery to uncover issues that may increase the value of a settlement, then
whether or not information is eventually admissible at trial becomes wholly
irrelevant. Nagareda suggests that "[c]ivil litigation as a process of civil
settlement, in short, demands a distinctive law of civil settlement procedure."5 7
At the very least, civil litigation needs a system that is better geared towards
guiding pretrial practice in the absence of the looming specter of trial.
B. A Lack ofActive JudicialInvolvement
Even if the civil justice system should be made more effective at dealing
with matters that will never be tried, this is not to say that litigants should be left
to work things out for themselves. To the contrary, another frequently heard
complaint about the civil justice system is a lack of active judicial
management. 8 Seemingly little has changed in the century since Roscoe Pound
noted that "in America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a
mere umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the game,
and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own way without
judicial interference.
And yet, nearly every study of the issue has found broad
agreement that early and active judicial involvement in a case leads to better, and
more satisfying, results.60
Indeed, in 2010, a Federal Judicial Center survey of NELA members found
that "two-thirds [of respondents] agree that judges do not invoke Rule 26
limitations on their own," and nearly half "also agree that judges do not enforce
Rule 26 to limit discovery."6 1 Similar majorities "believe that District Judges are
not available to resolve discovery disputes on a timely basis., 6 The ACTL and
IAALS also noted that "[j]udicial delay in deciding motions is a cause-perhaps

56. FED. R. Ci. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
57. Nagareda, supra note 53, at 694.
58. See, e.g., ACTL/IAALS REPORT, supra note 2, at 23 ("These Principles call for greater
involvement by judges.").
59. Pound, supra note 28, at 447.
60. See Afember Survey, supra note I, at 124 26 (finding that ain overwhelming majority of
respondents believed that early judicial intervention helped to narrow the issues, limit discovery,
and produce more satisfactory results): IAMBULRG & KosKI, supra note 9, at 13 ("Almost twothirds of NELA respondents agree both that early intervention in cases by either district or
magistrate judges helps to narrow the issues, and that when a judicial officer intervenes early on in a
case and stays involved, the results are more satisfactory.").
61. HAMBLRG & KoSKI, supranote 9, at 11.
62. llenber Sirvey. supra note 1, at 63. A possible saving grace is the fact that over twothirds of respondents believed that "magistrate judges are available to resolve discovery disputes on
a timely basis." Id. at 64.
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a major cause-of delay in our civil justice system." 63 There is anecdotal
support for this problem as well; according to Judge Higginbotham, "Judge
Gerald Tjoflat reports that ... [the] lions of the bar confided to him [(as Chief
Judge of the Eleventh Circuit)] that they were unable to see the federal district
judge before whom their cases were pending, for as long as a year-even in
complex litigation."64
If cases are unlikely to go to trial, the inability to get before a judge on
discovery and other pretrial matters can be particularly harmful because there
may be no later opportunity to resolve disputes. Of course, out-of-control
discovery can always add distortive costs to litigation, but at least parties can be
comforted in knowing that. when a case proceeds to trial, such practices are
unlikely to affect the final result, as the Federal Rules of Evidence provide a
counterweight to broad discovery. 65 But where parties will be assessing the
value of their claims outside of court based on the information they have found
during discovery, inadmissible or irrelevant evidence may have significant
effects on an eventual settlement. Thus, if fewer cases are going to trial, it is
necessary for judges to become more involved in discovery, not less so.
But of course, even if, as the saying goes, "90% of life is showing up," 66
parties require more from judges than just their attention. There are also
common complaints that "sanctions allowed by the discovery rules are seldom
,67
imposed," and there does appear to be a reluctance to impose sanctions for
discovery violations throughout the courts. Rule 37(c), for example, was
amended in 1993 to include an "automatic sanction [that] provides a strong
inducement for disclosure of material that the disclosing party would expect to
use as evidence."' 8 Nevertheless, many courts have refused to impose an
automatic sanction and have simply excused discovery violations. 9 Whereas
Rule 11 has iconic status within the bar and has become synonymous with

63. ACTL/IAALS REPORT, supra note 2. at 22.
64. Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts. 60
DUKE L.J. 745, 745 (2010).
65. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 402 (providing for the admissibility of relevant evidence only).
66. This saying is frequently attributed to Woody Allen, an American actor, director, and
comedian. See Interview by the Collider with Woody Allen (Aug. 15, 2008). available at
http: //collider. com/entertainment/interviews/article. asp/aid/8878 /tcid/ 1/pg/2 Ari Kaplan, he Other
10% ofLife, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2008. However, the saying has had many subsequent variations,
including: "90% of life is just showing up"; "80% of life is showing up"; and "80% of success is
showing up." See Rosland Gammon, Reuters Finds Woody Allen fWas Right: Show Up to Get the
Inside Scoop, REYNOLDS CENTER FOR BUS. JOURNALISM (May 19, 2011), http://business
joumalisin.org/2011/05/19/reuters-finds-woody-allen-was-right-show-up-to-get-the-inside-scoop/.
67. Member Survey, supra note 1, at 67.
68. FED. R. Cy. P. 37(c) advisory committee's note to 1993 amendment.
69. See generally 8B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2289.1, at 593-95 (3d ed. 2010) (noting that "the Second
Circuit held that a district judge erred in concluding that preclusion was mandatory," and that
"[o]ther courts have similarly concluded that preclusion is not mandatory, or that admission of
material improperly withheld was permissible" (citations omitted)).
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sanctions generally, Rule 26(g), its analogue in the discovery rules, is
"apparently [one of the] least understood or followed ... of the discovery
,.70
rules.,
C. The ChangingNature ofDiscovery
Finally, over the last several decades, the nature of discovery itself has
changed in ways that go to the heart of the civil justice system.'
Whereas
pretrial discovery was all but unknown at common law," the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-through the introduction of such discovery rules in 1938were expected, ironically, to lower the cost of litigation. "By mandating a full
exchange of information, the drafters thought that they could help less powerful
litigants prove their legal claims and thus redress the imbalance." 74 It is quite
possible this framework was a fool's errand from the start,75 but the system did
at least seem to work satisfactorily for the first thirty years or so.76
But, in the years since, several changes in discovery itself have thrown the
system out of balance. At least three trends may be to blame: (1) a steady
expansion in the accepted use of discovery in litigation; (2) a related growth in
the types of litigation that rely upon broad discovery; 8 and (3) most recently, the
78

70. Manciav. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 53 F.R.D. 354, 357 (D. Md. 2008).
71. See, e.g., BEISNER, supra note 14, at 9-11 (citations omitted) (providing a brief historical
overview of the Federal Rules and the various amendments affecting the discovery provisions).
72.

See, e.g., 6 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW

§

1845, at

375 76 (3d ed. 1940), quoted in Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298. 317 (4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson,
C.J., concurring in denial of rehearing and rehearing en banc) ("To require the disclosure to an
adversary of the evidence that is to be produced, would be repugnant to all sportsmanlike
instincts.... [The common law] did not defend or condone trickery and deception; but it did regard
the concealment of one's evidential resources and the preservation of the opponent's defenseless
ignorance as a fair and irreproachable accompaniment of the game of litigation.").
73. See BEISNER, supra note 14, at 7.
74. Kathleen L. Blaner et al., Federal Discovery Crown Jeiel or Curse?, 24 LITIG.,
Summer 1998. at 8.
75. Cf BEISNER, supra note 14. at 7-8 ("[T]he drafters ... dismissed clear waming signs that
these two key premises[-that discovery would reduce costs and that attorneys would pursue it
responsibly ]were deeply flawed. Abuse was already prevalent even under the limited discovery
that some states permitted at that time.").
76. Id. at 9 (citing Blaner et al., supra note 74, at 8: Richard L. Marcus, Discovery
Containment Rcdux 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 748-50 (1998)).
77. See, e.g., id. at 10 (stating that, going back to the 1970 amendments, the
amendments . . . allowed parties to use discovery devices as frequently as they wished" and that
"[t]he floodgates had been opened").
78. See id at 9-10 (citing Blaner et al., supra note 74, at 8; Robert L. Carter, he Federal
Rules of Civil Procedureas a Vindicatorof Civil Rights, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2179, 2181-83 (1989);
Patrick Higginbotham, Foreword, 49 ALA. L. REV. 1, 4-5 (1997): Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing
Expeditions Allowed: FIe HistoricalBackground of the 1938 FederalDiscovery Rules, 39 B.C. L.
REV. 691, 743 (1998)).
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rise of electronic discovery.79 Like the downward trends in the number of trials
and level of judicial engagement, these shifts in discovery are culturalso and,
unlike the relatively modest changes discussed in Part 111, are not easily

untangled.

Rather, they have altered the nature of the field of play, and the

system will remain unbalanced so long as these changes are not understood and
addressed.8
1.

The Growth of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure

An expansion in discovery, generally, has been in progress for most of the
last century. In 1911, the United States Supreme Court rejected the notion that
pretrial discovery was inherent in civil litigation and held that § 724 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789-which allowed federal courts to compel parties "to
produce books or writings"-only allowed for the production of such items at
trial.84 By way of comparison, the Court noted that an equitable "bill of
discovery cannot be used merely for the purpose of enabling the plaintiff in such
a bill to pry into the case of his adversary to learn its strength of weakness. A
discovery sought upon suspicion, surmise or vague guesses is called a 'fishing
bill.'""'
Just thirty-six years later, the Court approved broad discovery in the
landmark case of Hickman v. Tavlor. 6 In the intervening years, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure had been adopted, and the scope of discovery had
already been expanded in 1946 to expressly permit discovery of evidence that
would not be admissible at trial. Suddenly, the state of play had changed. As
the Court explained in Hickman:
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism established by Rules
26 to 37 is one of the most significant innovations of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure.... The various instruments of discovery now serve
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 16, to narrow

79. See id at 12 (citing Douglas L. Rogers, A Search for Balance in the Discovery of ESI
Since December 1, 2006, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 8, at 1 (2008), http://law.richmond.edujolt/vl4i3/
article8.pdf).
80. See id at 3.
81. See, e.g., id. at 21 (noting that recent reform efforts to limit the scope of discovery and
address challenges caused by the increasing use of electronic documents have proven largely
ineffectual).
82. See id at 31-32.
83. See id. at 6-11 (citations omitted).
84. Carpenter v. Winn, 221 U.S. 533, 537 (1911).
85. Id at 540.
86. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
87. See Subrin, supra note 78, at 736 (citing FED. R. Cly. P. 26 advisory committee's note to
1946 amendment).
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and clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for
ascertaining the facts, or information as to the existence or whereabouts
of facts, relative to those issues. Thus civil trials in the federal courts no
longer need be carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent
with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before trial. 8
Civil litigation came to be built around the full development of relevant facts
before trial. It became a cornerstone of civil practice that "pretrial procedures
make a trial less a game of blindman's buff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent." 89
The drafters of the Rules in 1938 were not particularly concerned that
discovery would be abused. 90 Rather, they thought that "discovery does not need
judicial attention because lawyers will practice it under a rule of reason
reinforced by mutual self-interest in avoiding the waste of their time or their
clients' money which results when unnecessary pursuit or resistance in the
discovery process occurs." I But even under the liberal discovery regime of the
1938 Rules, the one discovery device that sits at the root of most of today's
problems-the Rule 34 request for production of documents or things-was still
only available by judicial permission, following a showing of "good cause."
However, the 1970 amendments to the Civil Rules included "major changes
in the existing [R]ile [34]: (1) to eliminate the requirement of good cause; [and]
(2) to have the rule operate extrajudicially." 93 The advisory committee was not
without justification. The good cause requirement "furnished an uncertain and
erratic protection" because of the inconsistency of standards applied by courts.94
Additionally, the revision sought to match the Rules to the reality of existing
practice: only about a quarter of litigants seeking the inspection of documents or
things filed motions seeking court orders, and the party seeking production
almost always prevailed. 95 "In a. sense, the 1970 amendments to the [R]iles
completed what one could call a cultural cycle in American procedural
reform ... which was characterized by increased relaxation and expansion of

88. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500-01 (citing James A. Pike & John W. Willis. The New Federal
Deposition Discovery Procedure,38 COLUrl. L.REv. 1179, 1179, 1187, 1453-54 (1938); James A.
Pike, Die New FederalDeposition Discovery Procedureand the Rules of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV.
1, 1 (1939)).
89. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (citing Hickman, 329
U.S. at 501).
90. See BEISNER, supra note 14, at 7-8.
91. Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough Is Enough, 1981 BYU L. REv. 579, 581.
92. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34; see also 48 F.R.D. 487, 526 (1970) (indicating several major
changes made to Rule 34 in 1970).
93. 48 F.R.D. at 526 (advisory committee's note to 1970 amendment).
94.

Id.

95. See id at 527.
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procedure." 96 But they also led directly to the current environment, in which
discovery is carried out, in the first instance, entirely free from any judicial
oversight and is limited, in a practical sense, only by the attorneys carrying it
out.
Since "[p]arty-controlled discovery reached its high-water mark in the 1970
amendments," 98 we have spent the last forty years trying to chase the horse back
into the barn, with nearly constant attempts to "fix" the Civil Rules.99
2.

The Expansion in Litigation

The expansion of discovery abuse has also coincided with an evolution in
the types of lawsuits brought today. "It seems undeniable that broad discovery
has benefitted plaintiffs attempting to prove certain types of claims by enabling
them to obtain both 'smoking guns' and less inflammatory but critical
evidence." oo Civil rights suits, mass torts, and discrimination suits may be
particularly conducive to such broad discovery.10 1 As the Second Circuit noted,
"[b]ecause employers rarely leave a paper trail-or 'smoking gun'-attesting to
a discriminatory intent, disparate treatment plaintiffs often must build their cases
from pieces of circumstantial evidence which cumulatively undercut the
credibility of the various explanations offered by the employer." 0 2
Broad discovery can also facilitate types of public interest litigation that
might otherwise be impossible to bring because the material sought is unlikely to
be relevant to any individual suit. Products liability suits, for instance, may rely
on evidence of defects that simply would not come out if discoveR were
narrowly restricted to the specific claims brought by any given plaintiffs.
Even if broad discovery may not be strictly necessary for some newer causes
of action, the law has also developed in reliance on such broad discovery.10 4 In
1989, the United States Supreme Court held that a disparate impact claim must

96. Marcus, supra note 76, at 748.
97. See supra notes 58 59, 61-63 and accompanying text.
98. Marcus, supra note 76, at 749.
99. See id. at 752-53 (chronicling the wide variety of special committees and conferences in
the 1970s aimed at discovery reform).
100. Marcus, supra note 76, at 749.
101. See, e.g., id. ("Over the years developments in areas such as products liability
employment discrimination, and consumer protection have been the result at least partly of broadranging discovery provisions." (quoting Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supremne Court Adopts
Discovery Ainendnents to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 818
(1981))).

102. Hollander v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 895 F.2d 80. 85 (2d Cir. 1990).
103. Cf CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG., NINETEENTH CENTURY RULES FOR TWENTY-

FIRST CENTURY COURTS? 9-10 (2010) (quoting Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574 (2009))
(discussing the importance of discovery in tort suits).
104. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(quoting Jones v. Goord, No. 95 CIV. 8026(GEL), 2002 WL 1007614, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16,
2002)) (stating that liberal discovery is now a "cornerstone" of the litigation process).
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show that the employer conduct complained of was the cause in fact of a racial
imbalance.105 The Court noted that "[s]ome will complain that this specific
causation requirement is unduly burdensome on Title VII plaintiffs. But liberal
civil discovery rules give plaintiffs broad access to employers' records in an
effort to document their claims." 106 The Court, in a prior case, applied similar
reasoning in placing the burden on a plaintiff to rebut the employer's
nondiscriminatory justification, noting that because of "the liberal discovery
rules," such a requirement would not "unduly hinder the plaintiff."'o0
It should come as no surprise, then, that plaintiffs' attorneys often resist any
change that could threaten to narrow the scope of discovery.o But, because the
landscape of substantive law has evolved in reliance on broad discovery, simply
hacking away at the scope of discovery could have complex implications for the
civil justice system-results that would not have arisen if civil discovery had
never reached its current levels.
3. The 4dvent ofE-Discovery
The most recent change in the nature of discovery-and perhaps the most
jarring to the system-is the rise of electronic discovery. When the Civil Rules
were drafted. the amount of information available in any lawsuit was limited by
how much paper the parties could afford to generate and keep.
[T]he volume of potential discovery in any given case was once thought
of in terms of numbers of pages or even numbers of boxes. In contrast,
discovery is now frequently being thought of in terms of megabytes,
gigabytes, and even terabytes. This e losion of information has
brought along with it an explosion of costs.
Indeed, "[v]ast quantities of potentially relevant ESI are reaching
incomprehensible volumes and every potential litigant will be affected."1o
This rise in potentially relevant ESI has led to the need to search, review,
and produce thousands upon thousands of pages of data in many suits. A recent
study by the RAND Corporation on the costs of document discovery noted that

105. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989).
106. Id.
107. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258 (1981).
108. See generally CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LITIG., supra note 103, at 1-3 (criticizing and
opposing a proposal for radical changes to the civil justice systein that was made in an effort to
curtail discovery costs).
109. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., NOW IS THE TIME FOR MEANINGFUL NEW
STANDARDS

GOVERNING

DISCOVERY. PRESERVATION,

AND COST ALLOCATION

12 (2012),

available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%/o2OBooks/Civil/CV
2012-03 Addendumpdf.
110. LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 17, at 6.
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more than half of the cases sampled involved at least 100 gigabytes of data..1I
For a sense of perspective, one gigabyte is approximately 65,000 pages of
Microsoft Word documents or 100,000 pages of emails.
Assuming-probably
accurately-that most of those electronic files were emails, these productions
probably involved over 10 million pages of documents!
Even the mere existence of these massive amounts of data can be extremely
costly, particularly given the lack of clarity regarding how much data must be
stored and for how long in anticipation of litigation.'
But the review of
documents for responsiveness and privilege that is necessitated by litigation has
become particularly costly. 1 The RAND Corporation estimates that these costs
come to 73% of the total cost of production.
Moreover, depending on the type
of case, the total cost of production can range from tinder $10,000 to over
$80,000 per gigabyte.' 6 Although Federal Rule of Evidence 502 has attempted
to provide some protection for litigants faced with the impossible task of
reviewing hundreds of thousands of pages for privilege, the need to carefully
review every document cannot easily be wholly eliminated. 1
Notwithstanding any other issues arising in the civil justice system, the rise
of e-discovery has changed the game completely. As the Manual Jbr Complex
Litigation explains:
Conventional "warehouse" productions of paper documents often
were costly and time-consuming, but the burdens and expense were kept
in check by the time and resources available to the requesting parties to
review and photocopy the documents. In a computerized environment,
the relative burdens and expense shift dramatically to the responding

party. The cost of searching and copying electronic data is insignificant.
Meanwhile, the tremendously increased volume of computer data and a

111. PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 19, at 16 n1.39.
112. Discovery Services, How llany Pages in a Gigabyte?, LEXISNEXIS, http://Www.lexis
nexis.com/applieddiscovery/lawlibrary/whitePapers/ADI FS PagesInAGigabyte.pdf (last visited
Feb. 5, 2013) (also providing that Excel files are closer to 165,000 pages per gigabyte, and
PowerPoint presentations are a paltry 17,000 pages per gigabyte).
113. See generally Brian C. Vick & Neil C. Magnuson, The Promise of a Cooperative and
ProportionalDiscovery; Process in North Carolina: House Bill 380 and the New State Electronic
Discovery Rules, 34 CAMPBELL L. REv. 233, 239-40 (2012) (discussing costs of storing EST in
anticipation of litigation).
114. See PACE & ZAKARAS, supra note 19, at xi- xvi.
115. Id. at xv.
116. See id. at 103.
117. Cf Hopson v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.. 232 F.R.D. 228, 244 (D. Md. 2005)
(asserting that it would be unwise for parties to litigation to assume any "non-waiver" electronic
records production agreements "will excuse them from undertaking any pre-production
review ... or doing less of a pre-production review than is reasonable under the circumstances" and
concluding that the best practice "is to assume that complete pre-production privilege review is
required, unless it can be demonstrated with particularity that it wo'uld be unduly burdensome or
expensive to do so").

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/3

18

Grimm and Yellin: A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can M
2013]

A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO DISCOVERY REFORM

513

lack of fully developed electronic records-management procedures have
driven tip the cost of locating, organizing, and screening data for
relevance and privilege prior to production. Allowing requesting parties
access to the responding parties' computer systems to conduct their own
searches. which is in one sense analogous to the conventional warehouse
paper production, would compromise legally recognized privileges,
trade secrets, and often the personal privacy of employees and
customers.1 18
In short, e-discovery has placed us in a paradigm for which the Federal Rules
were never designed, and it has removed many of the practical limits that once
served to restrict the scope of discovery.

Any prudent reforms to modern discovery must first come to terms with the
current state of play. The number of trials is declining,119 judges are, perhaps,
less available and certainly more overworked than they once were,12 0 and
discovery is now run mostly by the parties,121 who must contend with novel
claims and massive amounts of ESI. Put simply, the realities facing the civil
justice system are not the same as they were in 1938. However, as we discuss in
the next Part, we believe there are still sensible, realistic reforms that can be
implemented and that would release some of the pressure that out-of-control
discovery has placed on our civil justice system.
111. PROPOSED REFORMS TO CIVIL DISCOVERY
Now that we have outlined some of the deeper issues that set the stage for
today's discovery problems, we can turn to less intractable issues and attempt to
fix what can more easily be fixed. In this Part, we will describe some of the
specific reasons why the system is as bad as it appears to be and what, if
anything, is being done, or can be done, to improve the civil justice system. We
do not pretend to possess any greater insight to these challenging questions than
the legions of judges, lawyers, and academics who have considered them before
us. We do propose, however, to offer our insight, from the perspectives of a trial
judge and practicing attorney, and offer three modest suggestions about where
improvements can be made. The first is to amend the rules to limit the scope of
discovery to only that information that is not privileged or work-product

118.

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 1 1.446, at 80 (4th ed. 2004).
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. See Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, Striking a Devil's Bargain: The Federal Courts and
Expanding Caseloads in the Twenty-first Century, 13 LEWIS & CLARI L. REv. 473, 473 & n.1

(2009).
121. See supra notes 58 59 aid accompanying text.
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protected and that is needed by the requesting party to prove the claims or
defenses that it has pleaded. The second is to amend the rules to incorporate the
concept of cost shifting or allocation, under which a party may obtain a base
level of discovery without any cost, but beyond which no additional discovery
may be obtained absent a showing of good cause and an evaluation of whether
the requesting party should bear all or part of the costs to the producing party of
the additional discovery. The third is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be amended to clearly state that the parties have an obligation to
cooperate during the discovery process in order to tailor the discovery to the
needs of the case and minimize the overall costs and burdens of discovery.
A.

No. 1. Excessively Broad Scope ofDiscovery

The scope of discovery is stated in Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Last amended substantively in December 2000, it creates a
two-tiered approach to what can be discovered in a civil action. A party may
discover as a matter of right "any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party's claim or defense,"12 subject to certain additional limitations to be
Thereafter, it may discover information more broadly
described below.
described as "relevant to the subject matter involved in the action" only upon a
showing of "good cause." 1 Furthermore, information that falls within the
scope of discovery, as provided by the rule, "need not be admissible at trial if [it]
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence." 12 The Advisory Committee's Note to the 2000 amendment to the
Civil Rules contains an extensive discussion of efforts to narrow the scope of
discovery "to address concerns about overbroad discovery."126 By allowing the
parties the freedom to control discovery of facts relevant to the claims and
defenses, while giving the court power to control discovery of facts that are more
broadly relevant to the subject matter of the litigation, the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee intended "that the parties and the court focus on the actual claims and
defenses involved in the action."1
However, the Committee added, with
prophetic insight, that "[the dividing line between information relevant to the
claims and defenses and that relevant only to the subject matter of the action
cannot be defined with precision"
-and therein lies the problem. The blurry
dividing line between the two categories, lawyers will tell you, has resulted in no
divide at all, and the goal of the amendment has not been achieved because
neither lawyers nor judges can accurately apply the rule. Accordingly, what
,,28

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Rule 26(b)(1) was amended in 2007 as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules.
FED R. Cil. P. 26(b)(1).
Id
Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
Id
Id

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/3

20

Grimm and Yellin: A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can M
2013]

A PRAGMATIC APPROACIH TO DISCOVERY REFORM

515

happens in reality is that discovery proceeds apace as broadly as before the rule
change. 129
Likewise, lawyers will tell you that the other limits on discovery currently
found in the rule have not done much to curb overbroad requests. For example,
the last sentence of Rule 26(b)(1) somewhat cryptically enjoins that "[a]ll
discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).,,1o One
might hope that a lawyer or judge reading that final sentence-and perhaps not
fully remembering the text of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)-would immediately turn to that
subsection of the rule and, in doing so, would immediately find a significant
additional limitation to the scope of discovery. If they did, they could not help
but notice that Rule 26(b)(2)(C)-applied as a counterbalance to the breadth of
Rule 26(b)(1)-is a very effective means to protect against overbroad and
burdensome discovery; 1but
only if it is actually understood by lawyers and
enforced by judges, neither of which, experience suggests, appears to be the
case.132 To fully appreciate this provision, the rule is worth quoting in full:
(C) WJ'hen Required. On motion or on its own, the court must limit
the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or
by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative,
or can be obtained from some other source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain
the information by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues
at stake in the action. and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.

129. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole?: The 2000
Limitation on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REv. 13. 14 (2001) (predicting
"that the amendment may lead to little positive change by way of curbing cost and excess in federal
discovery").
130. FED. R. Ci. P. 26(b)(1).
131. See FED R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
132. See generally Alember Survey, supra note I, at 76 78 (showing that approximately 60%
of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that they did not typically request Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
discovery limitations; that approximately 75% of respondents agreed or strongly agreed that judges
do not invoke Rule 26(b)(2)(C) sua sponte; and approximately 60% of respondents agreed or
strongly agreed that judges do not enforce Rule 26(b)(2)(C) to limit discovery). But see Gordon W.
Netzorg & Tobin D. Kern, ProportionalDiscovery: Making It the Norm, Rather than the Exception,
87 DENV. U. L. REv. 513. 530 (2010) ("[S]ome federal courts are slowly beginning to enforce
proportionality guidelines against litigants-albeit primarily in the context of electronic
discovery.").

133. FED. R. Cil.

P. 26(b)(2)(C).
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The limitations imposed on discovery by Rule 26(b)(2)(C)-colloquially,
but helpfully, referred to as the "proportionality" limit on discovery-are
intended to force both the lawyers
and the court, on its own initiative, to
consider a comprehensive list of cost-benefit factors and tailor the discover
sought to that which bears some reasonable relation to the issues in the case.
Therefore, the rule intends that the discovery that should be sought by the parties
and allowed by the court should be significantly more limited for a diversity
automobile tort case where the plaintiff seeks $100,000.00 in damages, than
what should be sought and allowed in a mass tort class action suit in which
billions of dollars are sought.136
But if you talk to trial judges who are routinely called upon to resolve
acrimonious discovery disputes, they overwhelmingly will tell you that lawyers
seem to be comprehensively ignorant of the significant limitations that Rule
26(b)(2)(C) imposes on the scope of discovery. It is as if lawyers, when reading
Rule 26(b)(1), skip right over the reference to Rule 26(b)(2)(C) in the last
sentence, or, if they do notice it, they do not then go to the referenced rule to
refresh their recollections as to what it says.
Similarly, lawyers and judges will tell you that Rule 26(b)(2)(B), which is an
important additional limit on the scope of discovery of ESI-public enemy
number one in the war to prevent overbroad and burdensome discovery-seems
to have had little effect in achieving its intended goal. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is titled
"Specific Limitations on Electronically Stored Information," and it states: "A
party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost."
The rule does allow the party denied EST discovery to file a
motion to compel discovery, at which time the party asked to produce the ES1
must back up its claim of undue burden or cost. 1 Under Rule 26(b)(2)(B), a
party faced with a Rule 34 document production request seeking EST from too
many custodians; for a period of time that is too extensive, given the events that
led to the lawsuit; or from sources that are not part of the electronic information
maintained and used by the party in the conduct of its ordinary affairs, can

134. Rule 26(g) expressly requires attorneys to respect the proportionality provisions of Rule
26(b)(2)(C), by requiring that "[e]very disclosure . . . and every discovery request, response, or
objection must be signed by at least one attorney of record," and that
[b]y signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry: ... (B) with respect to a
discovery request, response, or objection, it is: ... (iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case,
the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the action.
FED. R. Cly. P. 26(g)(1).
135. See The Sedona Conference, [ie Sedona Conference Commentary on Proportionalityin
Electronic Discovery, 11 SEDONA CONF. J. 289. 294 (2010).
136. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) (considering the amount in controversy).
137. FED. R. Cly. P. 26(b)(2)(B).

138. Id.
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simply refuse the request because it is disproportionately expensive or
burdensome, considering what is at issue in the case.13 9 In response, the
requesting party must then file a motion to compel its production, 140 which
requires a showing of good faith.' 1
Yet, to read the law review articles,
litigation blogs, and reports, or attend CLE programs on how to control and
manage EST discovery, it seems as if Rule 26(b)(2)(B) is, as a defense against
excessive or burdensome discovery, about as effective as the Maginot Line.
Collectively, we could spend the rest of our careers wondering why it is that
these limitations-carefully built into the rules themselves-have had so little
effect in ensuring the proportionality of discovery in civil litigation, but such
wondering would not change the status quo one bit. Rather, it might be more
productive to consider-as it increasingly has been done-how the current rules
could be amended, yet again, to achieve the goal that has to date been so elusive.
If the purpose of discovery in a civil case is to identify the facts that the parties
must produce at trial to actually prove the claims and defenses that have been
raised in the pleadings,143 then h shouldn't the scope of discovery be limited
to those essential facts? Put differently, why should your adversary have to bear
the expense of searching for information, reviewing the information for
privileged or otherwise protected material, and producing the information that is
merely relevant to the "subject matter" of the litigation, if it is not necessary to
actually prove something that is at issue in the litigation? For example, if the
outcome of a suit will turn on the intent of an employer when he terminated an
employee and if there are a series of emails authored by the employer to others
within the company discussing the termination decision, then why shouldn't the
discovery obligation of the defendant be to search for and produce a single copy
of each email that speaks to that issue? Broad discovery into the "subject
matter" of the defendant's business and personnel policies is unlikely to produce
additional evidence that the plaintiff will need to show intent when the employer
decided to fire the plaintiff. If the plaintiff insists on obtaining this broader
discovery, then-as will be considered in the next Part-does it make sense that
the defendant should bear the expense of finding it and producing it?
Now, of course, in reality the issues are often more nuanced than that, and in
individual cases, it may not be as easy in all instances to provide an inventory of
the facts that are needed from an adversary to prove your claims or defenses,
because-without knowing what your adversary has--ou may be hard-pressed

139. Id.
140. Id.

141. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a).
142. For an interesting article on the Maginot Line, see Irving M. Gibson, The Maginot Line,
17 J MOD. IIST. 130 (1945). The Maginot Line was an elaborate defensive barrier constructed
along France's borders with Germany and Italy. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 1358 (2002). During World War II, German troops easily outflanked these
fortifications by invading through Belgium. See id. Today, the term is often used to describe
something that inspires a false sense of security. Id.
143. See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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to articulate what you will need to prove your case. But that does not excuse the
fact that the logical starting place ought to be the causes of actions and defenses
actually pleaded, the elements of proof that must be met for each, and the
information that the party does not already have from sources other than their
adversary. At a minimum, discovery should be phased to focus first on the
actual evidence needed to prove the pleaded claims and defenses and only after
receipt and review of those facts, should it be broadened beyond those limits. 144
Under the current system, the parties too often ask for all of their discovery "up
front," in a sweeping discovery request that demands full production all at once,
which necessarily increases the costs and burdens on the producing party.
It is
true that lawyers can, and sometimes do, work together to implement phased
discovery to initially focus on the most important facts needed for the case, and
when asked to do so, judges are usually inclined to issue a pretrial discovery
order that accommodates and encourages this approach.14 6 But across the
spectrum of civil litigation, phased discovery happens too infrequently.
So, what's to be done about it? Currently, the Duke Subcommittee of the
Civil Rules Advisory Committee148 has developed a series of rule "sketches"
designed to identify changes to the existing Civil Rules to help curb excessively
burdensome and costly discovery.149 This process has been guided by public
input received during a one day "miniconference" held on October 8, 2012, in
Dallas, Texas.i 0 Participants included lawyers representing plaintiffs; lawyers
representing corporate, governmental, and institutional defendants; academics;
researchers; and judges.'15 The sketches "seek to advance the just, speedy, and

144. See supra notes 13, 126-27 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Back to the Future: Discovery Cost
Allocation and Mlodern ProceduralTheory, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 773, 778-83 (2011) (citations
omitted) (describing the current approach to discovery cost allocation under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure).
146. See generally Nathan R. Sellers, Note, Defending the FormalFederal Civil Rulenaking
Process: Why the Court Should Not Amend ProceduralRules Through JudicialInterpretatio,. 42
LoY. U. CH. L.J. 327, 354 n. 183 (2011) (discussing "phased discovery").
147. See, e.g., Lee HT.Rosenthal, Electronic Discovery Is the System Broken? Can It Be
Fixed?. 51 ADVOC. (TEX.) 8, 9 (2010), available at http://www.litigationsection.com/downloads!
Advocate _Vo15 1-Summerl0.pdf (stating that "[d]iscussion of phased discovery into ESI occurred
only about 10 percent of the time").
148. The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has two subcommittees currently working on
potential rules changes to address the issues raised during the Duke Conference. See Thomas Y.
Allman, E-Discovery Standards in Federal and State Courts After the 2006 Federal Amendments 2
(May 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ediscoverylaw.com/uploads/
file/2012FedStateEDiscoveryRules(May3).pdf. One is the Discovery Subcommittee and the other
is the Duke Subcommittee. which is charged with implementing the recommendations from the
Duke Conference. Id.
149. DUKE CONFERENCE SUBCOMM., CivIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., NOTES OF THE
DALLAS MINI-CONFERENCE (OCT. 8, 2012) 309 (2012). available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agendao20Books/Civil/CV2012-10.pdf.

150. Id.
151. Id.
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less costly disposition of litigation. The hope is that adopting a number of
changes all at once, as part of an integrated package, can have an important
impact."'
The proposals contained in the sketches include the following: (1)
changing Rule 4(m) to shorten the time for service of process-thereby
shortening the time until the court holds a conference with counsel to discuss the
case, particularly the discovery needed-and Rule 16(b) to shorten the time to
issue a scheduling order commencing discovery;'
(2) adopting a rule that
encourages informal conferences with the court before the filing of discovery
motions so as to reduce the cost and volume of motions, especially when, as
often is the case, a telephone or personal conference with the judge will resolve
the issues without the need for briefing;
(3) permitting the service (but not
requiring the filing of an answer) of certain discovery requests prior to the time
that the parties meet and confer pursuant to Rule 26(f), to discuss discovery and
related issues, so that the initial meeting will be more productive as a producing
party will more fully understand what the requesting party wants, can identify
any excessive scope or burden problems, and can propose alternatives; 1 (4)
amending Rule 26(b)(1)-the "scope of discovery rule"-to incorporate the
often overlooked "proportionality" language currently found at Rule 26(b)(2)(C),
in the hope that lawyers and judges will more fully appreciate the primacy of this
156
(5) limiting the number of discovery requests-such as
principle;
interrogatories, document production requests, and requests to admit-and
lowering the number of depositions allowed and the time for each deposition;
(6) changing the discovery rules to prohibit "boilerplate objections" to discovery
requests,
(7) introducing specific language into the Rules to permit cost
shifting for discovery only;
and (8) amending Rule 1 to introduce the notion
that it should be interpreted to promote cooperation among the parties during
pretrial proceedings in addition to achieving a just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.160 While the sketches are just that-draft
proposals designed to identify possible improvements and foster public
comment-they are an important step along the path to improving the current
state of things. f If approved for publication and comment, these sketches could
well blossom into new rules within a few years.162 Their effect, if enacted, could
provide new tools to ensure that the scope of discovery is not excessive.

152. Id
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See id.
at319.
Id. at 322 24.
See id at 324-326.
See id at 327-31.
See id.
at 331 35.
See id.
at 335 37.
See id at 339.
See id at 341.
See id. at 309.
See id.
at 354.
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B. No. 2. ProducingPartyPays vs. Requesting PartyPars
If you carefully read the discovery rules, you will not find any express
language regarding which party-the requesting party or the producing partyshould bear the cost of searching for; reviewing for relevance, privilege, and
work-product protection; and producing the information asked for in
discovery. 163 Implicitly, however, the rules establish a presumption that this
burden and expense falls upon the responding or producing party. 164 For
example, Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s entire cost-benefit, proportionality limitation on
discovery is designed to balance the need for the information sought against the
cost of its production and its importance to the resolution of the case.165
Similarly, Rule 26(c)-the protective order rule-permits a court to enter any
order needed "to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." 166 Moreover, Rule 26(g) requires that
each "discovery request, response, or objection must be signed" by an attorney
of record or self-represented party, certifying that, inter alia, a discovery request
is "neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the
needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the
importance of the issues at stake in the action."i 67 Obviously, if the requesting
party were required to pay for the costs associated with discovery under a "userpays" system, the rules would not need to have so many provisions designed to
provide the means for courts to issue orders preventing excessive and
disproportionate burden and expense to the producing party. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court, speaking long before the problems caused by the current
"ES1 discovery crisis," said:
Under [the discovery rules], the presumption is that the responding
party must bear the expense of complying with discovery requests, but
he may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule 26(c) to grant
orders protecting him from "undue burden or expense" in doing so,
including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's
payment of the costs of discovery. 168
Many critics of the current discovery rules argue that the "producer-pays"
paradigm is largely responsible for much, if not all, of the Rule 34-related

discovery abuse, especially regarding discovery of ESI. 169 They point out, not
unreasonably, that the current rules-despite the injunctions of Rules

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (providing discovery and disclosure rules).
See Redish & McNamara, supra note 145, at 774.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
FED R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978).
See Redish & McNamara, supra note 145, at 774.
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26(b)(2)(C), 26(g)(1)(B)(iii), and 26(c)-are ineffective for the fundamental
reason that they impose no economic incentive for the party asking for
information to moderate its requests to ensure that they are proportional to the
issues at stake and not excessively expensive to the producing party. 0 Even
more so, they say, the current rules actually create an economic incentive
purposely to ask for excessively expensive and burdensome discovery in order to
coerce the producing party to seek a settlement purely as a means to avoid
excessive discovery costs and not on the basis of the merits of the case.171
The clear solution, it is said, is to replace the flawed current system with one
that requires the requesting party to have some "skin in the game," meaning that
if they want any discovery, or discovery beyond a preset point, they should have
to pay for the expense to the responding party of producing it.172 That way, there
will be economic incentives set forth in the rules that will cause the requesting
party to ask for only what they are willing to pay for and concomitantly
eliminate the byproduct of the current rules-placing excessive cost and burden
on the producing part) currently required to shoulder all, or most, of it.13 From
an economic point of view, it is hard to argue with the logic of this position, but
opponents counter that it is overly simplistic because it assumes that the value of
all civil suits may be measured by determining a proportionate balance between
monetary damages foreseeable should a suit be successful and the costs of
obtaining the facts needed to obtain that result even though many civil claims are
filed to obtain results not easily measured by monetary dama es, such as civil
rights actions, whistleblower cases, and discrimination cases.
These so-called
"impact cases." brought to initiate change, often are initiated by organizations or
individuals without the significant financial resources that would be required to
maintain a suit under a "user-pays" system.
The language of the advisory note
to the 1983 amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure captured this notion
well:
The elements of Rule 26(b)[] address the problem of discovery that is
disproportionate to the individual lawsuit as measured by such matters
as its nature and complexity, the importance of the issues at stake in a
case seeking damages, the limitations on a financially weak litigant to
withstand extensive opposition to a discovery program or to respond to
discovery requests, and the significance of the substantive issues, as

170. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, Corporate Cooperation Through Cost-Sharing, 16 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 109, 123 (2009) (analogizing the requesting party to "an
unsupervised child in a candy store toting an unlimited credit card").
171. See John H. Beisner, Discoveringa Better Way: The Need for Efjective Civil Litigation

Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 549 (20 10).
172. See id. at 551, 586.
173. See id. at 585.
174. See Redish & McNamara, supra note 145, at 813 (quoting Martin H. Redish, Electronic
Discovervand the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561, 607 (2001)).
175. See id.
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measured in philosophic, social, or institutional terms. Thus the rule
recognizes that many cases in public policy spheres, such as
employment practices, free speech, and other matters, may have
importance far beyond the monetary amount involved. The court must
apply the standards in an even-handed manner that will prevent use of
discovery to wage a war of attrition or as a device to coerce a party,
whether financially weak or affluent.1 6
Opponents of a "user-pays" system also argue that its adoption would be a
radical departure from the method by which civil cases have been litigated in
federal court since the adoption of the discovery rules in 1938.
They contend
that the presumption that the producing party must pay for its own costs in
responding to proper discovery requests is wholly ingrained in the civil justice
system,' and any changes adopted to require "user pays," cost shifting, or cost
allocation, in whole or in part, would constitute a sea change in the way the
system works and would sow the seeds for its destruction.179 This criticism,
however, is a great exaggeration because, as noted, the current rules caution
against one party imposing disproportionately costly discovery burdens on an
adversary and afford the courts great flexibility to prevent abuse of the system.1 SO
A rational examination of this problem demonstrates that the authority for a
court to order cost allocation, cost shifting, or to impose all or part of the cost of
discovery on the requesting party has long been recognized as implicit in the
rules 8 and is well accepted by the case law.1
As for the former, the advisory notes to Rule 26(b)(2) clearly state:
The good-cause inquiry and consideration of the Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
limitations are coupled with the authority to set conditions for discovery.
The conditions may take the form of limits on the amount, type, or
sources of information required to be accessed and produced. The
conditions may also include payment by the requestingparty of part or
all of the reasonable costs of obtaining information from sources [of

176. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory conmittee's note to 1983 amendment.
177. But see Redish & McNamara, supra note 145, at 774 (stating that "the collective failure
on the part of most scholars and judges to question the theoretical foundations of our current model
of discovery cost allocation" is surprising).
178. See Sharpe, supra note 170, at 136 (citing Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 653 (2006)).
179. See generally Andrew Mast, Note, Cost-Shifting in E-Discovery: Reexamining Zubulake
and 28 U.S.C. § 1920, 56 WAYNE L. REV. 1825, 1840-41 (2010) (listing several common criticisms
of cost shifting in e-discovery).
180. See supra notes 123 24, 126-27, 130-41 and accompanying text.
181. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment.
182. See, e.g., Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 358 (1978) (stating that a
court has the discretion to grant orders conditioning discovery on the requesting party's payment of
the costs of discovery so as to protect the producing party from undue burden or expense).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol64/iss3/3

28

Grimm and Yellin: A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small Changes Can M
2013]

A PRAGMATIC

APPROACH TO DISCOVERY REFORM

ESI] that are not reasonably accessible.
A requesting party's
willingness to share or bear the access costs may be weighed by the
court in determining whether there is good cause.
As for the latter, the courts have long recognized that it is within their power
to order a party that requests costly and burdensome discovery from an opponent
to pay for all or part of it. Indeed, as already noted, Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v.
Sanders,184 which is cited as the primary authority for the "producer-pays"
system, recognized that the producing party may seek a protective order from the
court requiring the requesting party to bear all or part of the cost of burdensome
discovery.
Moreover, in a host of cases, courts throughout the country have
recognized that the authority to allocate some or all of the costs of discovery to
the requesting party is neither radical nor unfair, if properly undertaken.186
Furthermore, the experience of one of the co-authors of this Article-in
cases assigned to him for resolution-suggests that it is possible to introduce the
notion of discovery cost allocation in a wide range of civil cases without
undermining the civil justice system or even drawing any notice, much less
significant protest from the litigants. Rather, this experience suggests that if the
rules of procedure could be drafted to provide a "base level" of discovery that
was proportionate to the needs of the case, the burden and expense of which is
borne by the producing party with the provision that any further discovery must
be conditioned on a showing of good cause and an assessment of cost allocation,

183. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) advisory committee's note to 2006 amendment (emphasis
added).
184. 437 U.S. 340 (1978).
185. See id. at 358 (stating that a judge "may invoke the district court's discretion under Rule
26(c) to grant orders protecting [the responding party] from "undue burden or expense" in
[complying with discovery requests], including orders conditioning discovery on the requesting
party's payment of the costs of discovery").
186. See, e.g., Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int'l. LLC. 285 F.R.D. 331, 341 (E.D. Pa. 2012)
(stating that "the plaintiffs have asked for very extensive discovery compliance with which will be
very expensive," and as such, "absent compelling equitable circumstances to the contrary, the
plaintiffs should pay for the discovery they seek"); Schweinfurth v. Motorola, Inc., No.
1:05CV0024, 2008 WL 4449081, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2008) (holding that given the "sheer
size and scope of discovery," cost shifting was warranted); Foreclosure Mgmt. Co. v. Asset Mgmt.
Holdings, LLC, No. 07-2388-DJW, 2008 WL 3822773, at *7 (D. Kan. Aug. 13, 2008) (citing FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii)) (finding no undue burden for plaintiff to produce the requested
documents, but weighing the factors set forth in Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) and finding that it was
appropriate to shift the cost of discovery); Hagemeyer N. Am., Inc. v. Gateway Data Scis. Corp.,
222 F.R.D. 594, 602-03 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (citing Spears v. City of Indianapolis, 74 F.3d 153, 158
(7th Cir. 1996); Deitchman v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556, 564 (7th Cir. 1984))
(adopting the seven-factor Zubulake test and using Rule 26(c) as authority to grant the court
discretion "to create any order that would spare a party undue burden or expense"); Zubulake v.
UBS Warburg LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (setting forth seven factors to consider in
conducting the cost-shifting analysis under Rule 26); Byers v. Ill. State Police. 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d
(West) 740, 756 (N.D. 111.2002) (holding that if plaintiffs wanted archived emails produced, they
were responsible for paying the cost of licensing an old email program).
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there would be no unfairness to the requesting party or the producing party.
Indeed, the requesting party, aware that it must choose wisely when it seeks its
"free discovery," has an economic incentive to better tailor its requests to seek
what it genuinely needs to prove its case.187 During the time in which this
process has been put in place in individual cases assigned to the co-author, not
once has a requesting party come back to the court seeking additional discovery
for which it would be willing to pay. The key, however, is in figuring out how to
define the amount of "free discovery" so that it is sufficient to give the
requesting party a fair shot at the discovery it needs, while simultaneously
protecting the producing party from excessive cost and burden. While this
balancing may be done effectively in individual cases where the court has access
to the parties and can confer with them regarding how to tailor the amount of
discovery that should be available to the requesting party without cost, it is a far
more daunting task to accomplish by rule amendment when the rules must apply
to all litigation in the federal courts. Such rulemaking may be difficult; however,
that is no excuse to avoid the effort. The public manner in which rules are
amended in the federal system ensures that the views of all who may be affected
by a rule change would have notice and an opportunity to make their views and
recommendations known.
The bottom line is that cost containment in
discovery cannot be discussed seriously without entertaining the concept of cost
allocation. Rule amendments that do not include express authority to allocate
costs will be no more effective at cost control than those that have come before it
and failed. There are two logical places where cost allocation could be
addressed explicitly. The first is Rule 26(c), where the list of actions a court
may take to protect a party from excessive and overly burdensome discovery
could be amended to expressly include cost allocation. The second is Rule 34,
which could be amended to include specific limits on the amount of discovery of
ESI that may be obtained from an adverse party without cost to the requesting
party, with additional ESI discovery permitted on a showing of good cause and
cost allocation. Examples of such restrictions could include limits on the
number of custodians from whom ESI must be produced, limits on the span of
time from which ESI discovery may be required, and limits on the type of search
methodology to be employed by the party that has been served with a request to
produce documents.
C. No. 3. The Duty to Cooperate DuringDiscovery
Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, "These rules govern
the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district
courts .... They should be construed and administered to secure the just,

I87. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 148-51. 16142 and accompanying text.
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speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." 189 This
goal cannot be realized without a cooperative interaction among three entities:
the court, which defines and manages the discovery in each case; the lawyers,
who initiate and respond to discovery requests; and the parties, who bring and
respond to the lawsuit, direct the lawyers how to achieve their litigation goals,
and compensate them for the work done on their behalf. It does not require
Napoleonic insight to realize that all three of these entities must work in
synchronization if costs are to be contained to those proportional to what is at
stake in the litigation. It is equally obvious that for this synchronization to be
achieved, an appropriate amount of cooperation between the parties-and their
lawyers-is essential.
Despite the obviousness of this proposition, the
requirement of cooperation is entirely absent from the text of the discovery rules,
and the word "cooperation" appears only once in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: in the title of Rule 37, which states "Failure to Make Disclosures or
to Cooperate in Discovery; Sanctions."190 Moreover, the sad reality is that if you
ask anyone familiar with how litigation actually takes place in state and federal
courts whether cooperation between the parties during discovery is
commonplace, they will tell you with near unanimity that it is not.
It is beyond the scope of this modest Article to try to divine why this lack of
cooperation between parties is the case, but much has been written on the
topic. 19 1 One published opinion, written by the co-author of this Article,
considered this issue at length.192 The truth is that lawyers and clients avoid
cooperating with their adversary during discovery-despite the fact that it is in
their clear interest to do so-for a variety of inadequate and unconvincing
reasons. They do not cooperate because they want to make the discovery
process as expensive and punitive as possible for their adversary, in order to
force a settlement to end the costs rather than having the case decided on the
merits. 193 They do not cooperate because they wrongly assume that cooperation
requires them to compromise the legitimate legal positions that they have a good
faith basis to hold.
Lawyers do not cooperate because they have a misguided
sense that they have an ethical duty to be oppositional during the discovery
process-to "protect" their client's interests-often even at the substantial

189. FED.R. Civ. P. 1.
190. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
191. See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler, A Bull's-Eye View of Cooperation in Discovery, 10 SEDONA
CONF. J. 363, 365 (Supp. 2009) (analogizing cooperation to a "bulI's-eye"); The Sedona Conference,
The Case for Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 339, 356 (Supp. 2009) (discussing the need for
cooperation in discovery); The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation
Proclanation,10 SEDONA CONE. J. 331, 331 (Supp. 2009) ("With this Proclamation, The Sedona
Conference launches a national drive to promote open and forthright information sharing, dialogue
(internal and external), training, and the development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative,
collaborative, transparent discovery.").
192. See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 360-61 (D. Md. 2008).
193. See id. at 362.
194. See The Sedona Conference, The Casefor Cooperation,supra note 191, at 359.
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economic expense of the client. 195 Clients do not cooperate during discovery
because they want to retaliate against their adversary, or "get back" at them for
the events that led to the litigation.196 But the least persuasive of the reasons for
not cooperating during the discovery process is the entirely misplaced notion that
the "adversary system" somehow prohibits it.197
As the court noted at length in the Mancia case:
The central precept of the adversary process is that out of the sharp clash
of proofs presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting
is most likely to come the information upon which a neutral and passive
decision maker can base the resolution of a litigated dispute acceptable
to both the parties and society. This formulation is advantageous not
only because it expresses the overarching adversarial concept, but also
because it identifies the method to be utilized in adjudication (the sharp
clash of proofs in a highly structured setting), the actors essential to the
process (two adversaries and a decision maker), the nature of their
functions (presentation of proofs and adjudication of disputes,
respectively), and the goal of the entire endeavor (the resolution of
disputes in a manner acceptable to the parties and to society). However
central the adversary system is to our way of formal dispute resolution,
there is nothing inherent in it that precludes cooperation between the
parties and their attorneys during the litigation process to achieve
orderly and cost effective discovery of the competing facts on which the
system depends.198
Similarly, Professor Lon L. Fuller, a "celebrated professor at Harvard Law
School who wrote extensively on jurisprudence, including the importance of the
adversary system,"i99 stated:
Thus, partisan advocacy is a form of public service so long as it aids
the process of adjudication; it ceases to be when it hinders that process,
when it misleads, distorts and obfuscates, when it renders the task of the
deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult.
The lawyer's highest loyalty is at the same time the most tangible.
It is loyalty that runs, not to persons, but to procedures and institutions.
The lawyer's role imposes on him a trusteeship for the integrity of those

195. See id. at 344.
196. See id. at 359.

197. See Mlancia, 253 F.R.D. at 360-61.
198. Id.

at 361 (citing STEPHAN LANDSMAN, A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIO,

READINGS ON

ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH To ADJUDICATION 2 (1988)).

199. Id. at 361 n.4.
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fundamental processes of government and self-government upon which
the successful functioning of our society depends.
... A lawyer recreant to his responsibilities can so disrupt the
hearing of a cause as to undermine those rational foundations without
which an adversary proceeding loses its meaning and its justification.
Everywhere democratic and constitutional government is tragically
dependent on voluntary and understanding co-operation in the
maintenance of its fundamental processes and forms.
It is the law'er's duty to preserve and advance this indispensable
co-operation by keeping alive the willingness to engage in it and by
imparting the understanding necessary to give it direction and
effectiveness....
... It is chiefly for the lawyer that the term "due process" takes on
tangible meaning, for whom it indicates what is allowable and what is
not. who realizes what a ruinous cost is incurred when its demands are
disregarded. For the lawyer the insidious dangers contained in the
notion that "the end justifies the means" is not a matter of abstract
philosophic conviction, but of direct professional experience.200
In Mancia, the court further noted that:
A lawyer who seeks excessive discovery given what is at stake in the
litigation, or who makes boilerplate objections to discovery requests
without particularizing their basis, or who is evasive or incomplete in
responding to discovery, or pursues discovery in order to make the cost
for his or her adversary so great that the case settles to avoid the
transaction costs, or who delays the completion of discovery to prolong
the litigation in order to achieve a tactical advantage, or who engages in
any of the myriad forms of discovery abuse that are so commonplace is,
as Professor Fuller observes, hindering the adjudication process, and
making the task of the "deciding tribunal not easier, but more difficult,"
and violating his or her duty of loyalty to the "procedures and
institutions" the adversary system is intended to serve.20
As a result of these flagrant and intentional discovery abuses, Mancia observed

that "rules of procedure, ethics[,] and even statutes make clear that there are
limits to how the adversary system may operate during discovery."202
The Mancia court was not alone. In case after case, courts throughout the
country adamantly have stated that the discovery process mandates that the
parties cooperate to ensure compliance not only with Rule 1, but also with Rules

200. Id. at 361-62 (quoting Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility:
Report ofthe Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1162, 1216 (1958)).
201. Id. at 362 (quoting Fuller & Randall, supra note 200, at 1162).
202. Id. at 362-63 (footnotes omitted).
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26(b)(2)(C), 26(c), and 26(g)(1).203
Sadly, while some may feel that the
altogether uncivil manner in which civil litigation is conducted in this country is
a relatively
a product of the fact that there are so few civil trials anymore 2
contemporary occurrence-it is likely that it has always been so. In 1906, in
an address to the American Bar Association titled The Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the 4dministration of Justice, the legendary Dean Roscoe
Pound-one of the greatest legal minds of the time-observed:
A no less potent source of irritation lies in our American
exaggerations of the common-law contentious procedure. The sporting
theory of justice, the "instinct of giving the game fair play," as Prof.
Wigmore has put it, is so rooted in the profession in America that most
of us take it for a fundamental legal tenet. But it is probably only a
survival of the days when a lawsuit was a fight between two clans in
which change of venue had been taken to the forum. So far from being
a fundamental fact of jurisprudence, it is peculiar to Anglo-American
law; and it has been strongly curbed in modern English practice. With
us, it is not merely in full acceptance, it has been developed and its
collateral possibilities have been cultivated to the furthest extent. Hence
in America we take it as a matter of course that a judge should be a mere
umpire, to pass upon objections and hold counsel to the rules of the

203. See, e.g., Bd. of Regents of the Uiiv. of Neb. v. BASF Corp., No. 4:04CV3356, 2007
WL 3342423, at *5 (D. Neb. Nov. 5, 2007) (emphasizing that the theme of the recent amendments
to the discovery rules is "open and forthright sharing of information by all parties to a case");
Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C. 2004) (noting
that contentious and expensive discovery battles present challenges to the judicial system). See
also, e.g., Malot v. Dorado Beach Cottages Assocs., 478 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 2007) (reversing the
district court's dismissal with prejudice because it was too harsh of a penalty under the
circumstances and commenting that "[b]oth sides contributed to the contentiousness and lethargic
pace of the discovery process"); Sweat v. Peabody Coal Co., 94 F.3d 301. 306 (7th Cir. 1996)
(admonishing opposing attorneys for being "combative, obstinate, and wholly uncooperative in the
process of exchanging information"): Buss v. Western Airlines, Inc.. 738 F.2d 1053, 1053-54 (9th
Cir. 1984) (affirming a dismissal because of counsel's refusal to cooperate with opposing party);
Flanagan v. Benicia Unified Sch. Dist., No. CIV S-07-0333 LKK GGH. 2008 WL 2073952. at *10
(E.D. Cal. May 14, 2008) ("The abusiveness of plaintiffs discovery responses indicate a lack of
cooperative spirit."); Marion v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 1:06cv969-LTS-RHW, 2008 WL
723976, at *3-4 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 17, 2008) ("This court demands the mutual cooperation of the
parties."); In re Spoonemore, 370 B.R. 833, 844 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007) ("Discovery should not be a
sporting contest or a test of wills . . . ."). Various states have also implemented local court rules that
stress the importance of cooperation during discovery in order to "facilitate the just, speedy, and
inexpensive conduct of discovery in civil cases before the Court." U.S. DIST. CT. MD. R. app. A.
discovery guideline 1(a); see also U.S. DIST. CT. S. & E.D.N.Y. R. 26.4(a) ("Counsel are expected
to cooperate with each other, consistent with the interests of their clients, in all phases of the
discovery process and to be courteous with each other, including in matters relating to scheduling
and timing of various discovery procedures.").
204. See Kravitz, supra note 34, at 1.
205. This year was thirty-one years before the introduction of the discovery rules into the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Blaner et al., supra note 74, at 8.
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game, and that the parties should fight out their own game in their own
way withoutjudicial interference. We resent such interference as unfair,
even when in the interests of justice. The idea that procedure must of
necessity be wholly contentious disfigures our judicial administration at
every point. It leads the most conscientious judge to feel that he is
merely to decide the contest as counsel present it, according to the rules
of the game, not to search independently for truth and justice. It leads
counsel to forget that they are officers of the court and to deal with the
rules of law and procedure exactly as the professional football coach
with the rules of the sport. It leads to exertion to "get error into the
record," rather than to dispose of the controversy finally and upon its
merits. It turns witnesses, and especially expert witnesses, into partisans
pure and simple. It leads to sensational cross-examinations "to affect
credit." which have made the witness-stand "the slaughter-house of
reputation[s]." It prevents the trial court from restraining the bullying of
witnesses, and creates a general dislike, if not fear, of the witnessfunction, which impairs the administration of justice. It keeps alive the
unfortunate Exchequer-rule, dead in the country of its origin, according
to which errors in the admission or rejection of evidence are presumed
to be prejudicial and hence demand a new trial. It grants new trials
because by inability to procure a bill of exceptions a party has lost the
chance to play another inning in the game of justice. It creates vested
rights in errors of procedure, of the benefit whereof parties are not to be
deprived. The inquiry is not, what do substantive law and justice
require? Instead, the inquiry is, have the rules of the game been carried
out strictly? If any material infraction is discovered, just as the football
rules put back the offending team five or ten or fifteen yards, as the case
may be, our sporting theory of justice awards new trials, or reverses
judgments, or sustains demurrers in the interest of regular play.
The effect of our exaggerated contentious procedure is not only to
irritate parties, witnesses and jurors in particular cases, but to give to the
whole community a false notion of the purpose and end of law. Hence
comes, in large measure, the modern American race to beat the law. If
the law is a mere game, neither the players who take part in it nor the
public who witness it can be expected to yield to its spirit when their
interests are served by evading it. And this is doubly true in a time
which requires all institutions to be economically efficient and socially
useful. We need not wonder that one part of the community strain their
oaths in the jury-box and find verdicts against unpopular litigants in the
teeth of law and evidence, while another part retain lawyers by the year
to advise how to evade what to them are unintelligent and unreasonable
restrictions upon necessary modes of doing business. Thus the courts,
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instituted to administer justice according to law, are made agents or
abettors of lawlessness. 206
It would appear that there is something in the DNA of the American civil
justice system that resists cooperation during discovery. If that is so, then absent
a "gene mutation" that leads to a change of approach, it is likely that no amount
of rule amendments, court opinions, pilot programs, local rules, guidelines,
protocols, or standing orders will be sufficient to stop the decline of the civil
litigation system. But, there is reason for modest optimism. First, there are
proposals to amend the Federal Rules to include an explicit reference to the need
for cooperation during discovery,207 and as noted, some courts are starting to
stress this duty to cooperate in their local rules and discovery guidelines. 208
Second, the courts are increasingly insisting upon cooperation during
discovery.209 Third, there is anecdotal evidence that law schools-which have,
in the past, been blissfully ignorant of the need to teach discovery practice as an
essential component of a law school education-are beginning to encourage
classes devoted to pretrial discovery.20 Therefore, it may be that the next
generation of lawyers will be more attuned to the need to adopt a cooperative
approach during discovery-not because of any lofty ideals, but for the simple
expedient that lawyers who do so will achieve greater success for their clients
and advance their careers. Those that do not will write wills.
The authors of this Article believe that if cooperation is to be achieved, it
needs to be better defined, as it, like beauty, is dependent on the eye of the
beholder. Ironically, it may be easier to develop a working idea of what
cooperation is by focusing on what it is not. Cooperation does not require a
party to abandon or compromise a legitimate legal position.21 1 Rather, it
involves identifying how to achieve the maximum benefit for the client at the
lowest cost. Usually, this outcome is reached by attempting to come to a
common ground with an adversary on matters not directly related to the merits of
the legal position, but which affect how quickly and inexpensively the issue may
be resolved.
The following example will illustrate:
Assume that an employee whose job was eliminated by a reduction
in force brings an employment discrimination suit against her employer,

206. Pound, supra note 28, at 447-48 (quoting 1 WIGMORE, supra note 72, § 58. at 127
(1904); 2 WIGMORE, supra note 72, § 983, at 1112 (1904)) (citing Holland v. Chi., Burlington &
Quincy R.R. Co., 71 N.W. 989, 990 (Neb. 1897); Degraw v. Elmore, 50 N.Y. I (1872)).
207. See supra text accompanying notes 148-49, 160.
208. See sources cited supra note 203.
209. See cases cited supra note 203.
210. See generally Peter Toll Hoffman, Law Schools and the Changing Face of Practice, 56
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 203. 207 (2011-2012) (discussing curriculum changes in law schools to
include pretrial litigation courses focusing on discovery and motions practice).
211. See supra text accompanying note 194.
212. See Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 365 (D. Md. 2008).
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contending that she was fired as a result of gender discrimination and
not for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. During discovery, the
plaintiff serves document production requests demanding documents,
both "hard copy" and electronic, relating to all termination actions taken
by the company nationwide for the past twenty years. The defendant
takes the position that this discovery is overbroad and burdensome
because the case involves a single plaintiff alleging that she was fired
because of her gender and that the production of employment records
relating to terminations going back twenty years, covering the entire
country rather than the specific division at which plaintiff worked and
pertaining to former employees of both genders, is beyond the scope of
discovery in Rule 26(b)(1) and grossly disproportionate to what is at
issue in the case, in violation of Rules 26(g) and 26(b)(2)(C). Assume
further that the employer has reached this position after having done the
factual inquiry mandated by Rule 26(g)(1) and having prepared an
estimate of the cost of complying with the plaintiffs request, which
demonstrates that the cost would be substantial and would tie up the
time of many employees of the company, diverting them from their
normal assignments.
Most would agree that the defendant's legal position that the plaintiffs
discovery request is excessive and burdensome is a good faith, legitimate
position to take. 2 How, then, should defense counsel best protect the interests
of his client in asserting this position? One way is to adopt an adversary,
combative approach and file a written answer to the document production
request raising boilerplate, nonspecific objections, such as the discovery sought
is "overbroad, burdensome, irrelevant, and not likely to lead to the identity of
admissible evidence," 214 and refuse to produce any of the documents. The
inevitable response of the plaintiff s lawyer is to write a letter threatening to file
a motion to compel. After the defendant sticks to its guns and refuses to budge,
the plaintiff will then file the motion to compel, the defendant will file an
opposition, and the plaintiff will file a reply in response to the defendant's
opposition, all of which drives up the cost of the litigation to both parties, and
delays the progress of the case. 2 At this point, the court will need to resolve the
dispute, which may involve further delay. Under the facts of the case, there is
almost no chance that the defendant will prevail in its refusal to produce any
documents, as clearly some subset of what the plaintiff demanded is within the
scope of discovery and production of it would be proportional to what is at issue
in the case.2 16 Therefore, the defendant will not prevail, and the judge will issue

213. See FED R. Cly.P. 26(g).
214. See, e.g., Francis v. Bryant, No. CV F 04 5077 REC SMS P, 2006 WL 947771, at *2
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2006) (making similar objections).
215. See Member Survev, supra note 1, at 6.
216. See FED R. Cy. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
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an adverse ruling and, in doing so, may order production of far more documents
than the defendant anticipated. The court (and the plaintiffs counsel) will
perceive the defense counsel as having taken an unreasonable position, and the
end result is that the defendant will have lost complete control over the decision
of how many documents to produce, in what sequence, and at what expense.
The net result to the client is more expense, more delay, and an increased risk
that the court will order more documents produced than the defendant
anticipated, resulting in additional burden and cost.218
Contrast this approach with a cooperative one that the parties could take.
The defense attorney could write a civil, though direct, letter to plaintiffs
counsel, pointing out that the discovery request is far broader than the issues
pleaded in the complaint. The letter could particularize the estimate of the cost
to the defendant to comply with the request, and rather than refusing to produce
any documents (a position that the court is highly unlikely to agree with),
propose as an alternative to produce all documents going back five years from
the division in which the plaintiff worked relating to the termination of female
employees. Additionally, the defense counsel could suggest that if the plaintiff
agreed to modify her demand. as suggested by the defense counsel. the defense
counsel could produce the documents to the plaintiff within thirty days, and the
plaintiff could reserve the right, after having reviewed what the defendant
produced, to request additional documents, to which the defendant would still
have the right to object.
If the plaintiff agrees, then both parties to the litigation win. The plaintiff
gets prompt access to the records most likely to be relevant to her specific claim
without the expense and delay of motions practice, while concomitantly
reserving the right to request more documents if the results of reviewing the first
ones suggest that there may be additional relevant records. The defendant also
benefits because it too avoids the cost of motions practice and, more importantly,
gains control over the nature and timing of the documents it has to produce,
while significantly lowering the burden and cost of responding to the discovery
request. This cooperative approach works best for both parties because each
achieves a result that is clearly to its advantage, with minimal cost, and preserves
all of its legal positions regarding the propriety of the original document request.
Under this scenario, each lawyer has effectively represented his or her client,
advanced their interests, and avoided cost.
Assume, however, that the plaintiff responds to the defendant's cooperative
position by digging in and demanding everything in its production request. The
defendant may now take the initiative and file a Rule 26(c) motion for a
protective order, in which it gets to frame for the court the discovery dispute and
attach as an exhibit the letter written by the defense attorney to the plaintiffs

217. See Mancia. 253 F.R.D. at 359.
218. See Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. CISCO Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C.
2004).
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counsel. Because of its civil tone, the fact that the objections were supported by
particularized facts, and the solution offered was reasonable on its face, the
defendant will either win its motion-and the court will order the outcome
suggested by the defendant-or issue an order that perhaps grants more than
what the defendant proposed but unlikely anything near as expansive as what the
plaintiff demanded. Furthermore, in the process, the court will have formed a
positive impression of the defense counsel and a more negative one of the
plaintiff s counsel.
However measured, the above hypothetical shows that a cooperative
approach will net a better result to the defendant than a combative one.
Moreover, the defendant achieved a favorable outcome without abandoning its
legal position that the discovery sought by the plaintiff was overbroad and
burdensome. Rather, the defendant leveraged this position to achieve a result
that advanced its goals, lowered its expense, and did not delay the resolution of
the case. Thus, properly viewed, a cooperative approach to discovery is entirely
consistent with the principles of the adversary system and can be expected to
produce far better results for a client than a confrontational one, without
sacrificing the ability to preserve and assert legitimate legal positions held in
good faith.219
IV. CONCLUSION
It may well be that ever since the adoption of the discovery rules as part of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, parties have been dissatisfied with the
inadequacy of the rules,220 and the serial amendments intended to fix current
problems have not been sufficient to prevent the emergence of new ones. Given
the problems of civil practice focused on in this Article-the decline of the civil
jury trial, the lack of sufficient judicial involvement in the discovery process, and
the changing nature of discovery itself, as exemplified by the strains to the
system caused by the explosion of ES1 discovery 221it would be naive to expect
that a single set of rules first instituted in the 1930s would be sufficient to absorb
all these changes and still continue to operate at peak efficiency. Likewise, the
process of amending the federal rules piecemeal to focus on individual problems
without reexamining the entire premise underlying the discovery rules-factgathering aimed at resolving the case by a jury trial-has not satisfied the many
critics who still argue that the current rules are not up to the task of regulating
modern litigation practice where trials are so infrequent.
Perhaps the time will
come when there is a national consensus that the discovery rules should be
completely reimagined to deal with a system where civil cases are resolved

219.
220.
221.
222.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 194, 211.
Member Survey, supra note 1. at 6.
supra Part II.
supra Part ILA.
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through settlement or dispositive motion; however, it is hard to imagine that such
a time will be soon, as the belief in the importance of a civil jury trial is deeply
ingrained in the American legal system. To this point, the Duke Conference held
in 2010, which was the most comprehensive reexamination of the discovery
system in a generation, did not go anywhere close to proposing such a dramatic
change.
The Civil Rules Advisory Committee has taken seriously the concerns raised
at the Duke Conference by the many individuals and organizations that shared
their views. The Duke Subcommittee has developed a comprehensive series of
"sketches" outlining a number of potential changes to the discovery rules, the
collective effect of which would usher in real reforms to ensure that discovery is
proportional to the issues to be decided in the case and that the rules live up to
the aspirational objective of Rule 1224 that the civil procedure rules be
interpreted to achieve the "just, speedy, and inexpensive" resolution of cases.225
If approved for public comment, one can expect that these sketches will focus
the discussion of interested parties and organizations on a broad array of
potential rule improvements.
Similarly, as proposed in this Article, narrowing the scope of discovery to
focus on information that is neither privileged nor protected work product and
that is relevant to the actual claims and defenses raised by the pleadings could
greatly improve things, at least as long as there is a consensus that the purpose of
the discovery rules is to prepare for trial.226 Likewise, introducing an economic
incentive to make discovery proportional, by incorporating the possibility of cost
allocation for discovery that is sought beyond a threshold limit established by the
rules, would force litigants to prioritize their discovery requests to ensure that
they first ask for what they really need to prove their claims or defenses.
This
concept will likely draw vigorous debate; however, in truth, the law already is
well established that cost allocation is appropriate and authorized in certain
circumstances.
The key is to make sure that the concept is applied in a
manner that makes sense given a variety of factors, including the type of
litigation, the resources of the parties, and the type of relief sought. Finally, our
third recommendation-institutionalizing the concept of cooperation during
discovery into the rules of procedure-would work hand in glove with the other
two recommendations to help trim unnecessary costs and burdens and focus on
what facts truly are needed to resolve a particular dispute. 2 As we previously
noted, the one excuse most offered for not doing so at present is the misguided

223. See supra notes 8-17 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 148-62 and accompanying text.
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
226. See supra Part III.A.
227. See supra Part 1113.

228. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
229. See supra Part III.C.
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notion that cooperation somehow is at odds with the adversary system of civil
230
In fact, it is j List the opposite.
litigation.
It is difficult not to wonder what the topic of discussion will be twenty-five
or thirty years from now among trial lawyers, judges, and litigants as they muse
about the strengths or failings of the civil litigation system. Undoubtedly, there
will still be complaints. But wouldn't it be refreshing to imagine that whatever
those complaints may be, they would not be that the current generation of rules
drafters, judges, lawyers, academics, and litigants failed to act with commitment
and vision to adopt reforms, such as those discussed in this Article. Only time
will tell.

230. See supra notes 194, 197 98 and accompanying text,
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